The Importance of Reference Prices in Decision Making:
An Application to Commodity Marketing by Mattos, Fabio
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Cornhusker Economics Agricultural Economics Department
2015
The Importance of Reference Prices in Decision
Making: An Application to Commodity Marketing
Fabio Mattos
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, fmattos@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornhusker Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Mattos, Fabio, "The Importance of Reference Prices in Decision Making: An Application to Commodity Marketing" (2015).
Cornhusker Economics. 721.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker/721
 April 29, 2015 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln Extension 
Cornhusker 
Economics Institute of Agriculture & Natural Resources 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
http://agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics 
Follow us on Twitter and Facebook @UNLAgEcon 
The Importance of Reference Prices in Decision Making:  
An Application to Commodity Marketing 
Extension is a Division of the Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
cooperating with the Counties and the US Department of Agriculture. 
 
University of Nebraska Extension educational programs abide with the non-discrimination policies  
of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and the United States Department of Agriculture. 
 




Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average       
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . 146.67 163.11 158.63 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . . * 277.73 284.70 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. . * 218.88 229.80 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231.91 246.04 259.20 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 115.42 57.61 64.57 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116.27 67.78 67.83 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . . 146.00 145.67 137.67 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374.46 367.44 361.53 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices       
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.11 6.19 4.52 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.85 3.69 3.51 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 14.78 9.29 9.45 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.52 7.41 7.41 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.48 3.14 2.76 
Feed       
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . 190.00 200.00 190.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115.00 77.50 72.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 102.50 105.00 120.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235.00 172.50 178.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68.00 55.50 58.00 
  ⃰No Market 
    + 
When we are selling something, we evaluate mar-
ket prices by comparing them to some reference 
price that we have in mind. This comparison 
gives us an idea of whether a certain price is 
“good” or “bad”. For example, if I am a corn pro-
ducer and had a chance to sell corn for $4.20/bu a 
few months ago and now I can sell it only for 
$3.50/bu, it might feel like the current price is 
“bad” because I am comparing it with a higher 
price that would have allowed me to make more 
money. On the other hand, if my break-even price 
is $3.40/bu, then it might feel like the current 
price is “good” because I can still make a profit 
by selling above my break-even level. 
 
The distinction between “good” and “bad” prices 
is often associated with the notion of gains and 
losses. Selling corn at $3.50/bu when I could 
have sold at $4.20/bu feels like a loss because I 
missed the chance to make an extra $0.70/bu. 
Conversely, selling at $3.50/bu can feel like a 
gain since I am still receiving a price above my 
break-even level. This discussion is important 
because our behavior can change depending on 
whether we are dealing with gains or losses. 
 
Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahne-
man were the first researchers who systematically 
investigated how we make decisions based on 
reference points and how our behavior changes as 
we face gains or losses. Kahneman eventually 
received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his 
work in this area (Tversky was not considered for 
the prize because he had already died). Their gen- 
eral findings can be illustrated by a simple, yet power-
ful, experiment (Table 1). Participants were asked to 
choose between two investment strategies. First they 
were given two strategies involving gains: in A they 
would have a certain gain of $240, while in B they 
could gain either $1,000 (25% probability) or nothing 
(75% probability). The same participants were asked 
to make similar choices in the second part of the ex-
periment, but then Strategy A would give them a cer-
tain loss of $750, while in Strategy B they could lose 
either $1,000 (75% probability) or nothing (25% prob-
ability). 
Part 1: Investment decision involving gains Part 2: Investment decision involving losses 
Strategy A: sure gain of $240 Strategy A: sure loss of $750 
Strategy B:   25% chance of making $1,000 
       75% chance of making nothing 
Strategy B:   75% chance of losing $1,000 
       25% chance of losing nothing 
Table 1. Decision-making Experiment 
This experiment, applied to different situations and 
with some variations, was conducted with thousands 
of people and often provided the same general result. 
In Part 1, most participants would choose Strategy A, 
a guaranteed sure gain. They would not be willing to 
take the risk of making nothing for a chance to make 
more money. On the other hand, in Part 2 most partic-
ipants would choose Strategy B, indicating that they 
would be willing to take more risks when facing loss-
es. The majority of participants would prefer to take 
the risk of losing even more money for a chance to 
lose nothing. 
 
These findings suggest that we tend to be more cau-
tious when faced with gains and more prone to take 
risks when faced with losses. In other words, we are 
generally quick to guarantee a gain and reluctant to 
accept a loss. As Amos Tversky put it, “It is not so 
much that people hate uncertainty – but rather, they 
hate losing”. Further developments from neuroscience 
research have actually found that the human brain 
processes financial losses in the same areas that re-
spond to mortal danger. 
 
Since we often make decisions by comparing possible 
outcomes to reference points, and our behavior can 
change according to our perception of gains and loss-
es, it is important to identify how our reference points 
are formed and how they may change over time. In  
the context of commodity marketing, this is partic-
ularly relevant because it can affect the timing of 
marketing decisions. Going back to the initial ex-
ample, if I focus on the price of $4.20/bu from a 
few months ago, I might choose not to sell my 
corn now because I feel I would be losing money. 
But if I focus on my break-even of $3.40/bu, I 
might decide to sell it now and guarantee a profit. 
Do we actually focus on a specific piece of infor-
mation or use a combination of information? 
Jamie Poirier and I conducted a marketing simu-
lation with 75 wheat farmers in Manitoba, Cana-
da to explore these ideas. Farmers were asked to 
make marketing decisions every month during 
the marketing year (September to August). Each 
month they could sell any quantity of wheat 
(from zero to their whole crop), and they could 
still store their grain after the end of the market-
ing year. In addition, in each month of the simu-
lation, farmers were asked to indicate their price 
expectation for the next month, the price at 
which they would sell the rest of their wheat to-
day (which we consider as “Reference Price 1”), 
and the price at which they would sell the rest of 
their wheat in the next month (which we consid-
er as “Reference Price 2”). 
 
Results from this marketing simulation showed 
that farmers were eager to sell their grain when 
the current market price was above their self-
reported reference price, when the market was 
going up and when they expected price to go 
down in the following month. Conversely, they 
were reluctant to sell their grain in the opposite 
situations (Table 2). These findings are not sur-
prising, but they suggest that reference prices are 
relevant in marketing decisions. In the next part 
of the analysis, we investigated how their refer-
ence prices were formed and updated over time. 
Table 2. General Findings of our Marketing Experiment 
Farmers were eager to sell when: Farmers were reluctant to sell when: 
(i) market price was above their reference  
prices (feeling of gain) 
(i) market price was below their reference  
prices (feeling of loss) 
(ii) market was in an uptrend (ii) market was in an downtrend 
(iii) they expected price to go down (iii) they expected price to go up 
Our analysis showed that their reference prices during 
the simulation were positively correlated with four 
pieces of information: highest price of the marketing 
year, their price expectation for the next month, their 
self-reported break-even price, and the current market 
price. In particular, the highest price observed during 
the marketing year had the strongest influence on their 
reference prices. In addition, farmers would update 
their reference prices based on changes in market pric-
es during the marketing year and their price expecta-
tions for the following month. For example, they 
would increase their reference prices when the market 
was going up and they expected the market to go up in 
the next month, and decrease them when the market 
was going down and they expected the market to go 
down in the next month. Interestingly, upward adjust-
ments were twice as strong as downward adjustment, 
i.e. farmers would quickly increase their reference 
prices when the market was up, but slowly decrease 
their reference prices when the market was down 
(Figure 1). 
 
Let us think about the implications of these results in a 
marketing context using the following example. I am a 
corn farmer working on marketing my grain in a 
scenario of downward prices. As I try to decide 
when to sell my grain, I incorrectly calculate my 
break-even price and end up overestimating it i.e., 
I believe it is higher than it really is. I keep focus-
ing on the highest price of the marketing season 
that was observed a few weeks ago, which, com-
bined with my overestimated break-even price, 
puts my reference price above the current market 
price. Therefore, I will be reluctant to sell my 
grain now. Further, although the market keeps 
dropping, I incorrectly evaluate market conditions 
and believe the price will go up in the near future, 
which means I will reduce my reference price 
very slowly as the market continues going down. 
This scenario looks like the chart of the hypothet-
ical downward market in Figure 1. As market 
prices continue falling and I keep my reference 
price relatively high, I will become even more 
reluctant to sell my grain. Eventually, I will end 
up selling at much lower prices compared to what 
I could have sold. 
Figure 1: Example of Reference Price Adjustment When Market Is Up or Down 
 
Two general lessons can be taken from this example. 
First, it is fundamental to have appropriate infor-
mation on relevant variables that affect our reference 
prices and thus influence our marketing decisions. An 
accurate calculation of break-even prices is an essen-
tial starting point. In addition, we need a good outlook 
of commodity markets, which can obtained with dif-
ferent tools such as fundamental and technical analy-
sis (Cornhusker Economics, 11/12/2014). Second, it is 
important to have a plan that specifies carefully how 
we should act under distinct market conditions. Hav-
ing a clear and detailed strategy can help us avoid 
“traps” such as focusing on the highest price of the 
season and update reference price differently in up-
ward and downward markets. Following these lessons 
is not going to make marketing easy, but it can at least 
help us make fewer mistakes. As it is often said in 
sports, the winning team is the one that makes fewer 
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